| Feature | How it worked | Why it mattered |
|---|---|---|
| USD–Gold link | Foreign official holders could convert USD into gold at an official parity (historically $35/oz). | Created a credibility anchor; USD became the system’s core reserve/settlement currency. |
| Fixed but adjustable FX | Countries pegged to USD, but could adjust parity under “fundamental disequilibrium.” | Reduced FX volatility to support trade and rebuilding. |
| Capital controls | More restrictions on cross-border capital flows than today. | Helped preserve domestic policy autonomy under a quasi-fixed FX regime. |
| Institutions | IMF monitoring + financing; World Bank development lending. | Institutionalized global economic cooperation. |
| Dimension | Pros (what you gain) | Cons (what you give up) |
|---|---|---|
| Credibility | Hard constraint can anchor long-run inflation expectations. | Credibility is fragile if convertibility is doubted; defending parity can be costly. |
| Policy flexibility | Rule-based discipline (less discretionary money creation). | Less ability to cut rates / expand liquidity in recessions and banking stress. |
| Adjustment | External imbalances eventually force adjustment. | Often via internal deflation (wage/price pain) instead of FX depreciation. |
| Banking | May reduce inflation risk over long horizons. | In panics, lender-of-last-resort is constrained; crises can be deeper without backstops. |
| Asset / Unit | Why it can be held as “reserve” | Main limitations |
|---|---|---|
| USD | Deep Treasury market; global invoicing; Fed credibility; security alliances; established payment rails. | Fiscal path concerns; political risk narratives; sanctions/geopolitics can motivate diversification. |
| EUR | Large economy; strong legal systems; ECB framework; regional network effects. | Fragmented fiscal backing vs one U.S. Treasury; crisis governance perceptions; safe-asset fragmentation. |
| RMB | Trade footprint; policy push; growing market depth. | Convertibility/capital controls; institutional independence perceptions; geopolitical trust tradeoffs. |
| Gold | No issuer default risk; politically neutral asset; hedges extreme tail risks for some holders. | No yield; storage costs; not a payment unit for modern trade scale; price volatility exists. |
| Bitcoin | Censorship-resistance narrative; portable; supply rule. | Volatility; regulatory uncertainty; no LOLR; limited role as unit of account. |
| Stablecoins | Payment/infrastructure layer (fast settlement), often USD-linked in practice. | Run risk; reserve quality/segregation; regulation; can shift deposits away from banks. |
| Category | What it mainly is | Why it matters to the monetary system | Main risk channel |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bitcoin | Volatile digital asset; limited unit-of-account role. | Challenges “store of value” narratives; political/tech debate; not core settlement for trade. | Volatility + regulation + limited lender-of-last-resort. |
| Stablecoins | Tokenized claims intended to track a fiat value (often USD). | Can move payments outside banks; may increase USD reach globally via token rails. | Run risk; reserve quality; bank disintermediation; regulatory arbitrage. |
| Tokenized deposits / CBDC | Bank/central-bank liabilities in digital form. | Modernizes rails without “private money” run risk (design dependent). | Privacy, governance, and bank funding model impacts. |
| Lever (choose) | What it does (mechanism) | Main tradeoff / risk |
|---|---|---|
| Signals “non-liability” hedge; reduces exposure to sanctions/freeze narratives; credibility hedge. | No yield; valuation volatility; does not create a euro safe-asset market by itself. | |
| De-risk geopolitical concentration; reduces reliance on dollar plumbing at the margin. | Could raise transaction frictions; may be symbolic unless euro markets deepen further. | |
| Improves reserve-currency conditions: scale + liquidity + collateral quality (repo/settlement). | Political feasibility; moral hazard concerns; governance complexity. | |
| Strengthens security backing—one key reserve-currency criterion; lowers tail-risk perceptions. | Budget tradeoffs; inflation/deficit concerns; requires credible medium-term fiscal plan. | |
| Attempts to keep deficits contained while funding security priorities. | Political backlash; inequality/social risk; may weaken domestic cohesion (credibility channel). | |
| Preserves social stability while raising revenue; can support long-run institutional credibility. | Growth effects; tax competition; implementation delays. | |
| Reduces vulnerability to external shocks; improves “war economy” resilience and credibility. | Efficiency costs; subsidy politics; risk of fragmentation across member states. | |
| Builds network effects; reduces reliance on external rails; can boost euro usage in invoicing/settlement. | Takes time; requires coordination; may face private-sector adoption constraints. | |
| Modernizes rails without private-money run risk (design-dependent); supports sovereignty. | Privacy concerns; bank disintermediation if poorly designed; governance risk. | |
| Trilemma lever: reduces destabilizing flows; can preserve policy space under stress. | Market stigma; may reduce attractiveness of euro assets if overused. |